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Abstract
To reduce strategic misreporting on sensitive topics, survey researchers increasingly use list experiments
rather than direct questions. However, the complexity of list experiments may increase nonstrategic mis-
reporting. We provide the first empirical assessment of this trade-off between strategic and nonstrategic
misreporting. We field list experiments on election turnout in two different countries, collecting measures
of respondents’ true turnout. We detail and apply a partition validation method which uses true scores to
distinguish true and false positives andnegatives for list experiments, thus allowingdetectionof nonstrategic
reporting errors. For both list experiments, partition validation reveals nonstrategic misreporting that is:
undetected by standard diagnostics or validation; greater than assumed in extant simulation studies; and
severe enough that direct turnout questions subject to strategic misreporting exhibit lower overall reporting
error.We discuss howour results can inform the choice between list experiment anddirect question for other
topics and survey contexts.
Keywords: survey experiments, survey design, list experiments, sensitive questions, measurement error,
misreporting, satisficing
1 Introduction
How should political scientists elicit sensitive information from survey respondents as towhether
they hold attitudes or behave in ways that defy a social norm or formal rule? Direct questions on
such topics raise sensitivity concerns among respondentswho truly defy the normor rule (“norm-
defiers”), leading them to falsely claim compliance. This direct question strategic misreporting
(Ahlquist 2018) results in measures of norm-defiance that suffer from false negatives, i.e., defiers
wrongly measured as compliers.1 For example, false negatives arise in turnout studies when
respondentswho failed to vote in a recent election—and thereby defied the civic normof electoral
participation (Blais and Achen 2019, 476)—claim to have voted—i.e., to have complied with the
norm—when asked directly about their turnout (Presser 1990; Belli, Traugott, and Beckmann
2001).
To avoid direct question strategic misreporting, political scientists increasingly use list exper-
iments to ask survey respondents about sensitive topics. By masking individual answers to a
sensitive question, list experiments are held to reduce sensitivity concerns among norm-defiers,
thereby reducing strategic misreporting and consequent false negative measurements. Recent
research, however, suggests the extra cognitive effort demanded by list experiment questions
may induce nonstrategic misreporting (Ahlquist 2018; Kramon and Weghorst 2019; Riambau and
Ostwald 2020): facing a longer, more complex question, respondents may bemore likely to either
1 Our terminology is premised on the goal being to detect norm-defiance, so that a norm-defier is a “positive” case and a
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satisfice or make mistakes. Crucially, unlike strategic misreporting—which only affects norm-
defiers—nonstrategic misreporting plausibly induces reporting errors for both norm-defiers and
compliers, causing false negatives among the former and false positives among the latter.
How severe is list experiment nonstrategic misreporting in practice? And once we account
for realistic levels of such misreporting, does a list experiment on a sensitive topic still reduce
overall reporting error compared to a direct question? These questions are critical for researchers
deciding between measuring a sensitive variable via direct question or list experiment. Exist-
ing research, however, does not answer them directly. Studies of nonstrategic misreporting in
list experiments provide circumstantial evidence of its existence via placebo tests (Kramon and
Weghorst 2019; Riambau and Ostwald 2020) or assume its degree and precise nature in simula-
tions (Ahlquist 2018; Blair, Chou, and Imai 2019), but do not compare list experiment to direct
question reporting error. Existing empirical validation studies that do compare list experiment
and direct question performance rely on comparison of aggregate prevalence estimates to each
other (“comparative prevalence validation”) or to a true population benchmark (“population
prevalence validation”), neither of which distinguishes true and false positive measurements
on the sensitive variable. They may therefore yield similar results whether a list experiment is
correcting strategicmisreporting amongnorm-defiers—thereby increasing the true positive rate—
or inducing additional nonstrategicmisreporting among norm-compliers—thereby increasing the
false positive rate (Höglinger and Jann 2018).
In this paper, we provide the first empirical validation of list experiments that distinguishes
the increases in true positives (due to reduced strategic misreporting) from the increases in
false positives (due to increased nonstrategic misreporting) that they may generate compared
to a direct question. We present two new validation studies of list experiments on nonvoting in
elections. These were fielded to samples from relatively educated populations in two different
contexts: New Zealand and London following their respective 2017 General Elections. Crucially, in
both studies, we collectmeasures of individual respondents’ true scores on the sensitive variable,
i.e., whether they voted in the election or not, based on official records.
To exploit these true scores in a way that distinguishes true and false positives and negatives,
we detail and apply a partition validation approach for list experiments. Similar to the approach
developed by Höglinger and Jann (2018) for the randomized response technique, it involves
partitioning the sample by true score and calculating standard list experiment prevalence esti-
mates within each resulting subsample. We show how the numbers of true positives and false
negatives are identified based on the list prevalence estimate among actual norm-defiers, while
the numbers of true negatives and false positives are identified based on the list prevalence
estimate among actual norm-compliers. By applying this partition validationmethod, we provide
the first empirical assessment of each type of reporting error in list experiments versus direct
questions.
We find that, in both the New Zealand and London cases, standard diagnostics and standard
validation approaches suggest list experiment measures of nonvoting are unproblematic and
probably better than directmeasures. However, partition validation based on true scores changes
this conclusion. It shows that, while direct questions in both surveys do induce strategic misre-
porting and consequent false negatives among actual norm-defiers (i.e., nonvoters), neither list
experiment successfully reduces false negatives among these respondents. Moreover, both list
experiments appear to increase the rate of false positives among actual norm-compliers (i.e.,
voters), consistent with them inducing additional nonstrategic misreporting compared to the
direct question. These false positives are common enough that they imply a rate of list experiment
nonstrategic misreporting that is, even under conservative assumptions, double that assumed
in extant simulation studies. Taking false positives and negatives together, both list experiments
perform significantly worse than direct questions in terms of overall reporting error. In additional




















































































































analysis, we provide evidence from the London survey that satisficing is an important driver of list
experiment nonstrategic misreporting.
Our empirical analysis contributes to the literature on list experiments byproviding the clearest
evidence todate that list experiments do induce anadditional andnontrivial amount of nonstrate-
gic misreporting error in practice, even in relatively educated samples previously thought to be
least prone to such behavior (Kramon and Weghorst 2019). This in turn informs applied survey
research on sensitive topics by highlighting the need for researchers deciding between a direct
question and a list experiment to consider not just the well-known trade-off between strategic
misreporting under the direct question and the statistical inefficiency of the list experiment (Blair,
Coppock, and Moor 2020), but also the misreporting trade-off between direct question strategic
misreporting and list experiment nonstrategic misreporting.
To help researchers think through this misreporting trade-off, we develop a simple parame-
terization of it in the Discussion section. We use our validation results to locate our two studies
within the parameter space, then consider the ways in which list experiments in other contexts
may plausibly depart from ours and with what consequences for the misreporting trade-off. For
the topic of nonvoting or similarly sensitive topics fielded in survey settings like the oneswe study,
our results suggest that any advantage of list experiment over direct question in terms of reduced
strategicmisreporting is outweighed in practice by disadvantages in terms of increased nonstrate-
gic misreporting. To be clear, this does not mean that direct questions always outperform list
experiments: in other scenarios, where the topic of interest is of sufficiently enhanced sensitivity
compared to nonvoting (increasing probability of direct question strategic misreporting among
norm-defiers), orwherenorm-defier prevalence is sufficiently greater than inour cases (increasing
thenumberof respondents “at risk”of direct question strategicmisreporting), list experimentswill
outperform direct questions in terms of expected overall reporting error, provided the amount
of list experiment nonstrategic misreporting is similar to that apparent in our surveys. However,
we also suggest that researchers surveying respondents in medium- or low-education settings
may reasonably expect list experiment nonstrategic misreporting to be more common than we
find in the comparatively well-educated setting of New Zealand and London. In such cases, topic
sensitivity and norm-defier prevalence will need to be even higher again before list experiments
can be expected to outperform direct questions on overall reporting error.
A final contribution of this article is to demonstrate how researchers validating list experiments
can use partition validation to fully exploit contextswhere true scores on the sensitive variable are
available. This is valuable because our results highlight how standard list experiment diagnostics
and validation approaches are insufficient to detect list experimentmisreporting errors that occur
in practice. In particular, standard prevalence validation applied to each of our list experiments
suggests unproblematic or superior performance, because the list prevalence estimate of nonvot-
ing is higher than the direct question estimate. Yet partition validation shows how these higher
list prevalence estimates are in fact the result of an increase in false positive errors (consistent
with an increase nonstrategic misreporting), rather than a reduction in false negative errors (due
to reduced strategic misreporting).
2 Misreporting in Direct Questions and List Experiments
To clarify the consequences of direct question strategic misreporting and list experiment non-
strategic misreporting for different types of reporting error, we begin by formally characteriz-
ing both processes. Let X ∗
i
be an indicator capturing the true status of survey respondent i =
{1, . . . ,N } on the sensitive variable.X ∗
i
= 0when i complies with the social norm or formal rule of
interest, and X ∗
i
= 1 when i defies it. The true prevalence of norm-defiers is thus π = Pr(X ∗
i
= 1).
LetXi be an indicator capturing respondent i’s self-reported status on the sensitive variable, with
Xi = 0 andXi = 1 indicating reported norm-compliance and -defiance, respectively.




















































































































2.1 Direct Questions and Strategic Misreporting
Direct questions concerning a sensitive topic generally elicit truthful responses from norm-
compliers (i.e., Xi = X
∗
i
= 0). However, due to sensitivity concerns (e.g., social desirability bias
or fears of the repercussions should a truthful answer be disclosed to third parties), norm-defiers
oen misreport their true status as Xi = 0, thereby generating false negative measurements
(TourangeauandYan2007, 863). This is referred toas strategicmisreporting (Ahlquist 2018). Letting
θ = Pr(Xi = 0|X
∗
i
= 1) denote the probability with which norm-defiers strategically misreport for
a direct question, the expected proportion of false negatives in the sample is θπ.
The direct question estimator of norm-defier prevalence is π̂Direct = 1
N
∑N
i=1Xi . Under the above
assumptions, Å(π̂Direct) = (1− θ)π. Thus, as θ increases, Å(π̂Direct) decreases, inducing downward
bias in the norm-defiance prevalence estimator.
2.2 List Experiments and Non-Strategic Misreporting
A list experiment is conventionally assumed to reduce strategic misreporting by asking about
the sensitive item indirectly and thereby reducing sensitivity concerns among norm-defiers. A
standard design randomly allocates respondents to either a list of J control items (treatment
statusTi = 0) or a treatment list (treatment statusTi = 1) containing the J control items plus the
sensitive item. In either case, respondents are asked only to report how many of the listed items
they affirm, not which items they affirm. Let Zi j (T ) be an indicator denoting whether respondent
i affirms control item j = {1, . . . , J } under treatment status T = {0,1}. DefineYi (0) =
∑J
j=1 Zi j (0)
andYi (1)=
∑J
j=1 Zi j (1)+Xi as respondent i’s potential reported itemcounts under the control and
treatment conditions, respectively, andYi =Yi (Ti ) as their realized reported itemcount. Under this
design, individual respondents’ answers to the sensitive item are masked from the researcher, or
anyone else. Yet under the assumption of “no design effects” (i.e.,
∑J
j=1 Zi j (0) =
∑J
j=1 Zi j (1)) and
“no liars” (i.e., Xi (1) = X
∗
i
), the researcher can still obtain an unbiased estimate of norm-defier
prevalence by taking the difference in means (DiM) of reported item counts for the treatment and







i=1(1−Ti )Yi , whereN1 =
∑N
i=1Ti is the size of the treatment
group and N0 = N −N1 is the size of the control group (Blair and Imai 2012).
Even if list experiment masking eliminates strategic misreporting among norm-defiers, recent
research proposes that the added complexity of the list question—which asks respondents to
consider multiple items and to sum affirmed items before responding—may lead to increased
nonstrategic misreporting (Ahlquist 2018; Kramon and Weghorst 2019; Riambau and Ostwald
2020). This occurs when respondents do not properly engage with the list question or make
mistakeswhenanswering it. For example, respondents aremore likely to satisficewhenanswering
more complex survey questions and do so by devoting less than optimal effort, performing some
necessary cognitive steps roughly or skipping them altogether (Krosnick 1991).
Formally, let the indicator S ∗
i
capture whether respondent i is a list experiment nonstrategic
misreporter. S ∗
i
= 0 when respondent i answers the list question via the process conventionally
assumed, with potential responses that satisfy the no design effects and no liars assumptions.
S ∗
i
=1when respondent i answers the list questionviaanalternativeprocessprone tononstrategic
misreporting errors. Let λ = Pr(S ∗
i
= 1) denote the probability that a given respondent is a list
experiment nonstrategic misreporter. We assume that the expected DiM among nonstrategic
misreporters, which we define as Å(π̂List
S∗=1






= 1), is not driven by the
true rate of norm-defiance among such respondents. Rather, it depends on the decision rule that
nonstrategic misreporters use to pick their reported item count, and how the resulting reported
itemcount varies as a functionofwhether they are askedabout the longer treatment list or shorter
control list.
Unlike strategic misreporting—which only leads to false negatives—a crucial feature of list
experiment nonstrategic misreporting is that it plausibly leads to both false negatives among




















































































































norm-defiers and false positives among norm-compliers. To see this, consider the example “uni-
form” nonstrategic misreporting scenario hypothesized in Ahlquist (2018) and argued to be plau-
sible in Blair et al. (2019). In this scenario, nonstrategic misreporters give an item count that
is a random uniform draw from the response options available. This implies expected item
counts of Å(Yi (0)|S
∗
i
= 1) = J
2
for the control list and Å(Yi (1)|S
∗
i
= 1) = J+1
2
for the treatment list,
and an expected DiM among nonstrategic misreporters of Å(π̂List
S∗=1
) = 0.5. Among nonstrategic
misreporters who are actual norm-defiers, this expected DiM is lower than the true norm-defier
prevalenceofone, leading to falsenegatives in expectation. Amongnonstrategicmisreporterswho
are actual norm-compliers, this expected DiM is higher than the true norm-defier prevalence of
zero, leading to false positives in expectation.
This uniform process is just one possible example of a nonstrategicmisreporting process. More
generally, any such process that generates Å(π̂List
S∗=1
) < 1 implies false negatives among norm-
defiers (as would strategic misreporting), and any nonstrategic misreporting process generating
Å(π̂List
S∗=1
) > 0 implies false positives among norm-compliers (unlike strategic misreporting). Thus,
one need not assume a uniform nonstrategic misreporting process to be concerned that a list
experiment may generate both false negatives and false positives: a range of nonstrategic misre-
porting processes can generate both types of error. As will be argued in the following section, this
feature of nonstrategic misreporting means that existing list experiment validation approaches
canmislead because they do not distinguish false from true positives and negatives.
Before proceeding, we note that list experiment nonstrategicmisreporting generally biases the
list prevalence estimate, the quantity of interest in much applied research. Ahlquist (2018) and
Blair et al. (2019) demonstrate the bias in DiM prevalence estimate for two specific types of non-
strategicmisreportingprocess. Importantly, unlikewithdirectquestion strategicmisreporting, the
bias inducedby list experimentnonstrategicmisreportingcanbeeithernegativeorpositive. To see
this, take the case where S ∗
i
is independent of X ∗
i





)= π. Then,Å(π̂List)= (1−λ)π+λÅ(π̂List
S∗=1
), whichmakes clear that for all
λ > 0, the list prevalence estimator will be biased in expectation except in the special case where
Å(π̂List
S∗=1
) = π. The bias will be positive when Å(π̂List
S∗=1
) > π and negative when Å(π̂List
S∗=1
) < π. Since
bothλ andÅ(π̂List
S∗=1
)will usuallybeunobserved, both themagnitudeandsizeofbiaswill bedifficult
to gauge in practical applications.
3 Existing Evidence
We argue that existing evidence leaves open important questions about the practical trade-
off between nonstrategic misreporting in list experiments and strategic misreporting in direct
questions. We first discuss studies of nonstrategicmisreporting in list experiments, before turning
to more general list experiment validation studies.
3.1 Existing Evidence on Nonstrategic Misreporting in List Experiments
Two recent studies use placebo tests to examine nonstrategic misreporting in list experiments.
Riambau and Ostwald (2020) run list experiments where the additional item on the treatment list
has a known true sample prevalence of zero, butwhich yieldDiMs that are positive and significant,
consistent with nonstrategic misreporting where some respondents condition reported item
count on list length. Kramon and Weghorst (2019) compare respondents’ item counts for a list of
manifestly nonsensitive topics to the counts implied by the same respondents’ answers to direct
questions on the same topics. The counts should not differ as there should be no direct question
strategic misreporting for the list question to ameliorate. But they do differ in 60% of cases (and
more so among respondents with lower numeracy and literacy) suggesting that list experiment
measures may differ from direct question ones not just by reducing strategic misreporting, but
also because their “complexity and difficulty” (p. 4) induces more reporting errors.




















































































































Despite this evidence of list experiment nonstrategic misreporting, key questions remain for
applied researchers choosing between list experiments and direct questions. First, Riambau and
Ostwald (2020) benchmark list prevalence estimates against true scores only, so cannot gauge
the relative magnitude of list versus direct question misreporting error. Second, Kramon and
Weghorst (2019) compare list and direct question responses only, so cannot gauge themagnitude
of misreporting errors for either relative to the truth. Third, neither study examinesmeasurement
of a sensitive topic, which is essential to assess whether any increase in nonstrategicmisreporting
inducedby using a list experiment rather thandirect question outweighs the reduction in strategic
misreporting. The evidence we present below does all of these three things.
Alvarez et al. (2019) identify likely survey satisficer respondents via screening questions and
show that they respond differently to both direct questions and list experiments than do other
respondents. However, in the absence of true scores on the sensitive item, they cannot establish
whether these differences arise because satisficers misreport more or because the their true
prevalence rate differs, nor whether list experiments inducemore or lessmisreporting than direct
questions in each group.
Others examine how problematic nonstrategic misreporting is for list experiment estimators.
Building on Ahlquist (2018), Blair et al. (2019) suggest a diagnostic test for list experiment mea-
surement error (whether strategic or nonstrategic) that compares maximum likelihood (ML) and
nonlinear least squares (NLS) estimates. They show that nonstrategic misreporting does bias
list prevalence estimates, but find in simulation studies that the DiM prevalence estimator and
NLS estimator are more robust to nonstrategic misreporting than are ML estimators, and that
all estimators exhibit only mild biases for the scenarios they consider. They also develop new
regression estimators that explicitly model a uniform nonstrategic misreporting process and a
“top-biased” process (where nonstrategic misreporters always select the maximum item count
available), although they recommend that, due to its “simplicity and robustness” (p. 473), basic
DiM should still be used to estimate prevalence alone. These studies offer valuable guidance,
but do not speak explicitly to the misreporting trade-off between list experiment and direct
question.Moreover, the simulationsusedmustmakeassumptionsabout thenatureand frequency
of nonstrategicmisreporting. The validation evidence we present below offersmore direct empir-
ical evidence concerning the severity of nonstrategic misreporting error in list experiments in
practice.
In sum, existing research suggests that nonstrategic misreporting does occur in practice in list
experiments. However, for applied researchers consideringwhether the use of a list experiment in
their survey will reduce overall misreporting on a sensitive topic, further evidence is required on
the relative severity of list experiment nonstrategicmisreporting anddirect questionmisreporting
in practice.2
3.2 Existing Validation Approaches
Themost common approach to list experiment validation in existing studies involves simple com-
parisonof list anddirect questionprevalence estimates. This approach,whichwe call comparative
prevalencevalidation, invokesa “more isbetter” assumption (TourangeauandYan2007;Höglinger
and Diekmann 2017): the list experiment is judged to improve on the direct question when
it estimates greater norm-defier prevalence. By this criterion, the list experiment significantly
outperforms a direct question in 63% of 48 comparative validation studies covering a range of
sensitive topics (Holbrook and Krosnick 2010).
2 Blair et al. (2020) doexamine list experiment versusdirect questionperformance. They focus, however, on a list experiment
assumed to eliminatemisreporting but which is inefficient versus a direct questionwhich is subject to strategicmisreport-
ing butmore efficient. We focus onwhether a list experiment outperforms a direct question on reporting error even before
considering efficiency.




















































































































Population prevalence validation additionally compares direct and list experiment prevalence
estimates against an observed true populationbenchmark andmakes a “closer is better” assump-
tion: if its prevalence estimate is closer to the population prevalence, the list experiment offers a
bettermeasure. For example, Rosenfeld, Imai, andShapiro (2016) benchmark list anddirect preva-
lence estimates of anti-abortion attitudes against actual population support for anti-abortion
measures in a public referendum, and others benchmark election turnout estimates against
official population turnout (e.g., Holbrook and Krosnick 2010; Kuhn and Vivyan 2018).
However, both comparative and population prevalence validation approaches may mislead in
the presence of nonstrategic misreporting (Höglinger and Diekmann 2017; Höglinger and Jann
2018). Comparative prevalence validation assumes that list experiments only generate higher
norm-defier prevalence estimates than direct questions due to reduced strategic misreporting
causing reductions in false negative measurements. However, list experiment prevalence esti-
mates may be higher than direct question estimates not because the list question reduces false
negatives among norm-defiers, but because nonstrategic misreporting for the list question yields
additional false positives amongnorm-compliers. A similar problemariseswith population preva-
lence validation: compared to a direct question which underestimates population prevalence
due to strategic misreporting, a list experiment subject to nonstrategic misreporting may move
the norm-defier prevalence estimate closer to the population benchmark by increasing false
positives amongnorm-compliers (Höglinger andDiekmann 2017).3 Toproperly assesswhether list
experiments reduce misreporting compared to direct questions, we need validation approaches
that distinguish false from true negative and false from true positive responses (Höglinger and
Jann 2018).
4 Validating List Experiments Using True Scores
We add to the above body of evidence by (1) fielding list experiments where we are able to
obtain respondents’ true scores on the sensitive variable and (2) exploiting these true scores to
distinguish true and false positives and negative measurements. This section sets out how we
accomplish (2) given (1).
In a setting where one observes true scores on the sensitive variable, one straightforward
extension to the validation approaches discussed above is sample prevalence validation. Given
respondents’ true scores, we know the true sample prevalence of norm-defiers and can compare
list experiment DiM and direct prevalence estimates against this benchmark. Unlike with pop-
ulation prevalence validation, differences in true sample and population prevalence no longer
confound the comparison of list and direct estimate performance. However, there remains the
problem that, compared to a direct question subject to strategic misreporting, a list experiment
subject to nonstrategic misreporting may yield a prevalence estimate closer to the true sample
prevalence due to an increase in false positives rather than a reduction in false negatives.
How, then, canweuse true scores on the sensitive variable to distinguish false and true positive
and negative measurements and thereby properly assess list versus direct question reporting
errors? For a direct question, it is straightforward to distinguish reporting errors given access
to true scores X ∗
i









is a false positive. Yet distinguishing false and true positives and negatives for a
list experiment measure is more challenging. Precisely, because of its masking properties, a list
experiment does not yield individual-level measures of the sensitive variable, so these cannot be
compared to individuals’ true scores.
3 True population prevalencemay also differ from the true sample prevalence due to sampling or nonresponse biases, such
that aprevalenceestimateexactlymatching true sampleprevalencemaymisleadingly appear inferiorwhen judgedagainst
population prevalence.




















































































































However, as Höglinger and Jann (2018) point out in the context of the randomized response
technique (which also masks individual responses), one can separately identify the rate of true
and false positives and negatives through a processwe label partition validation. This involves: (a)
partitioning the sample based on observed true scores X ∗
i
; and (b) calculating a DiM prevalence
estimate separately for true norm-defier and norm-complier respondents. How does this distin-
guish error types? First note that, among true norm-defiers, the true prevalence of norm-defiers
is, by definition, πX ∗=1 = 1, such that only true positives or false negatives are possible. The list
DiM prevalence estimate among true norm-defiers, π̂List
X ∗=1
, thus gives the rate of true positives
in this subsample, while 1− π̂List
X ∗=1
gives the rate of false negatives. Second, among true norm-
compliers, the true prevalence of norm-defiers is, by definition, πX ∗=0 = 0, and only true negatives
or false positives are possible. Thus, the list DiM prevalence estimate among true norm-compliers,
π̂List
X ∗=0
, gives the false positive rate in this subsample, and 1 − π̂List
X ∗=0
gives the true negative
rate.
Putting this together, and letting NX ∗=0 and NX ∗=1 denote the number of true norm-compliers
and -defiers in the sample, respectively, the total implied number of true positives (denoted tp),
false positives (f p), true negatives (tn), and false negatives (f n) for the list experimentmeasure can
be computed as follows:
tp = NX ∗=1π̂
List
X ∗=1, (1)
f p = NX ∗=0π̂
List
X ∗=0, (2)










Based on these quantities, we can compute a confusion matrix—a contingency table
of true scores against reported scores (Manning, Raghavan, and Schütze 2009, 307–308)—
for the list experiment. Comparing the confusion matrix of the list experiment to that of
the direct question can tell us about error mechanisms. If the direct question suffers from
strategic misreporting, the direct question should generate a nontrivial rate of false negatives
among norm-defiers but few false positives among norm-compliers. If the list experiment
corrects strategic misreporting and does not induce nonstrategic misreporting, it should
generate fewer false negatives than the direct question and no more false positives. If the list
experiment fails to correct strategic misreporting, it will generate a nontrivial number of false
negatives among norm-defiers, like the direct question. If the list experiment induces additional
nonstrategic misreporting compared to the direct question, this will generate either or both
false negatives among norm-defiers and false positives among norm-compliers, with the mix
of false positives and false negatives determined by the precise (unobserved) nonstrategic
misreporting process that pertains. Thus, while a nontrivial level of false negatives for the list
experiment is an indicator of either strategic or nonstrategic misreporting, a nontrivial level
of false positives for the list experiment is a clear indication of some form of nonstrategic
misreporting.
We can also summarize and compare the overall rate of reporting errors in the list experiment
anddirect question in termsofaccuracy, the fractionof all survey respondents correctlymeasured
on the sensitive variable (Manning et al. 2009, 155–156). Höglinger and Jann (2018) focus on this
statistic (which they label the “correct classification rate”)when validating a randomized response
technique.





















































































































We apply partition validation to two list experiments on election turnout. We fielded these in New
Zealand and in London (UK) and collected measures of respondents’ true score on the sensitive
variable through inspectionof official electoral records.4 Here,wedescribe the survey instruments
and data collection.
5.1 Survey Instruments
We embedded the New Zealand list experiment in the 2017 New Zealand Election Study (NZES).
The NZES collected responses from 3,455 respondents, sampled from the national electoral rolls.
Respondents were contacted by mail beginning 4 days aer the general election of September
23. Fieldwork continued until early March 2018, although approximately 97% of responses were
received within two months of commencement. The London list experiment was fielded via an
online YouGov surveyof a sampleof 3,189Greater Londoners following the June8, 2017UKgeneral
election (fieldwork began on June 23 and ended on July 24, 2017). We surveyed Londoners, rather
than Britons generally, to make collection of true turnout measures economically feasible (the
official records necessary for this must be accessed physically at each local authority office).
Further details on sampling and fieldwork for each survey are provided in online Appendix A.
Table 1 presents the list experiment and direct questions used to measure turnout in each
survey. In both surveys, all respondents were randomized to either the control or treatment list
(the latter being the list question in Table 1 with the item in parentheses included). List response
options ranged from zero to four (control group) or five (treatment group), and a “don’t know”
response was available.
In designing the list experiments, we follow recent practice. Several design choices in particular
merit discussion. First, in both the New Zealand and London designs, we include control activities
which we expect most respondents to have undertaken (“Discussed the election with. . .”) and
which we expect few respondents to have undertaken (“Worked or volunteered for one of the
party campaigns” or “Put up a poster for a political party in my window or garden”). This follows
Blair and Imai (2012) design advice and is intended to minimize ceiling and floor effects—where
respondents affirm or negate all control items, so that their sensitive item response is no longer
masked—whichmay undermine the ability of the list experiment to reduce strategicmisreporting.
Second, we included only election-related control items in both list experiments. On the one
hand, there is a risk that including election-related control items may prime respondents to
become concerned about their general level of political engagement, increasing sensitivity of
the turnout item and counteracting any sensitivity-reducing effect of list experiment masking.
On the other hand, including control items on a different topic to the sensitive item may draw
respondents’ attention to that item and enhance its sensitivity (Lax, Phillips, and Stollwerk 2016).
Furthermore, the inclusion of low-cost, high-prevalence, election-related activities among list
control items may reduce the sensitivity of the turnout item by allowing respondents to indicate
that they did at least partake in some election activities, even if they did not vote. On balance, our
expectation is that this design choice should reduce the sensitivity of the turnout itemand thereby
enhance the ability of each list experiment to reduce strategic turnout misreporting compared to
the direct question. It should also discourage nonstrategic misreporting for the list experiments,
since coherent grouping of question topics reduces cognitive processing costs for respondents,
making satisficing or mistakes less likely (Krosnick and Presser 2010).
Third, while the New Zealand control items consist exclusively of “norm-compliant” election-
related behaviors, we include two “norm-defiant” behaviors (“avoided watching the leaders
debate” and “criticised a politician on social media”) among the four London control items.
4 Replication data and code for this study are available at Kuhn and Vivyan (2020a) and Kuhn and Vivyan (2020b).
























































































































Here is a list of things
that some people did, and
some people did not do,
during the election
campaign or on election
day. How many of these
things did you do? You
don’t need to tell us which
ones you did, justhow many.
• Discussed the election
with family, friends,
or workmates
• Saw a news story about
the election campaign
• Worked or volunteered
for one of the party
campaigns
• (Voted in the
election)
• Watched the election
results coming in on
election night
How many of these things
did you do?
The next question deals
with the recent general
election on 8th June. Here
is a list of four (five)
things that some people did
and some people did not do
during the election
campaign or on Election
Day. Please say how many of
these things you did. Here
are the four (five) things:
• Discussed the election
with family and
friends





• Avoided watching the
leaders debates
• Put up a poster for a
political party in my
window or garden




Looking at the election
results, we can see that a
lot of people didn’t manage
to vote. Did you vote in
the election on September
23, did you not manage to
vote, or did you choose not
to vote?
• Cast a vote
• Chose not to vote
• Didn’t manage to vote
Talking with people about
the recent general election
on 8th June, we have found
that a lot of people didn’t
manage to vote. How about
you, did you manage to vote




Norm-defiant control items were included in a list experiment on turnout with promising pop-
ulation prevalence validation results by Kuhn and Vivyan (2018). They reason that norm-defiant
control items signal to respondents that it is recognized that some people do not like or engage
with politics, thereby further reducing the potential discomfort of admitting nonvoting. To the
extent that this holds, the London list experiment should bemore effective than the New Zealand
one at reducing strategic turnoutmisreporting amongnonvoters. On the other hand, the inclusion
of norm-compliant and -defiant items on a list may confuse respondents, which may result in
greater list experiment nonstrategic misreporting in London compared to New Zealand.
Both surveys also include a standard direct turnout question (Table 1, bottom row). In the New
Zealand survey, the direct question was asked of all respondents at least 41 questions aer the
list experiment (itself the second item on the survey). In case exposure to the turnout item in the
list question primed list treatment group respondents in any way (Blair and Imai 2012), we subset




















































































































to direct question responses from list control group respondents in the main validation analysis
below.5
In the London survey, we have two separate direct measures of turnout based on the same
question wording: a baseline (pretreatment) measure from a direct question that YouGov asked
of panelists in the days immediately following the election and a measure from a direct question
included in our survey for list control group respondents (asked immediately aer the list ques-
tion). For ourmain validation analysis below, we rely on the lattermeasure.6 The “baseline” direct
measure of turnout will be used later when testing for the effects of satisficing on list experiment
misreporting error.
5.2 True Turnout Measures
Each survey respondents’ true turnout in the relevant general election was measured via manual
inspection ofmarked electoral rolls. For New Zealand, true turnoutmeasurements were collected
by the NZES team. Of the 3,455 2017 NZES respondents, definitive measures of true turnout
were obtained for 3,451 (99.9%): these respondents were successfully located and their turnout
status clearly observed on the marked election rolls. Remaining respondents with nondefinitive
true turnout measures are treated as missing. For London, we collected definitive true turnout
measures for 2,595 respondents (82.4%). The rateofdefinitive true turnoutmeasurements is lower
than for the NZES, because, unlike the NZES, YouGov do not sample directly from the electoral
register. The resulting samplemay therefore contain respondents (a)whoarenot on the register or
(b) whose name and address details recorded with YouGov contain errors preventingmatching to
the official register. The lower rate of definitive true turnoutmeasurements in London is a concern
for list experiment validation if respondentswhodo anddonot have definitive true turnout scores
differ systematically in how they answer list and direct turnout questions. We see little reason for
this to be the case, and are reassured by the similarity between the London and New Zealand
results below, given the latter sample contains almost no respondents with missing true turnout
scores. Online Appendix A gives further details on true turnout measurement.
6 Results
This section examines list experiment versus direct turnout question performance in the New
Zealand and London studies. We first summarize results of standard list experiment diagnostics,
before presenting the standard information validation results researchers would observe in the
absenceof sensitive variable true scores.We thenpresent results of partition validation, exploiting
the true score measures available in our two studies.
6.1 Standard Diagnostics
For each list experiment,we carriedout keydiagnostics recommended in the literature (full results
reported in online Appendix C). We find no clear indication that either experiment violates key
assumptions or yields problematic measures of the sensitive variable.
First, there is no strongevidenceof associationbetween treatment assignment and respondent
characteristics in either setting. Second, both experiments pass diagnostics for violations of the
“no design effects” assumption: we find no negative estimated proportions of “respondent types”
(Blair et al. 2019, 468–469, 473) and fail to reject the null hypothesis of no design effects in formal
significance tests (Blair and Imai 2012, 63–65). Third, following Blair and Imai (2012), we check for
potential “ceiling” or “floor” effects, where substantial numbers of respondents either negate or
affirm all control items and are therefore incentivized to strategically misreport on the sensitive
5 Online Appendix F shows that substantive results hold when using the full sample direct turnout measure.
6 Online Appendix F shows that substantive results holdwhenusing thebaseline direct question insteadof the control group
direct question.






















































































































0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
(a) Prevalence estimates: New Zealand
Difference
(list − direct)
−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
(c) Difference in estimates: New Zealand
List experiment
Direct
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
(b) Prevalence estimates: London
Difference
(list − direct)
−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
(d) Difference in estimates: London
Figure 1. Estimated prevalence versus true population prevalence. Notes: Plots (a) and (b) show direct and
list estimates of nonvoting rates for the New Zealand and London surveys, respectively. Dashed vertical
lines denote actual population nonvoting rates. Plots (c) and (d) show differences between direct and list
estimates. Open and filled circles denote raw and population-weighted estimates, respectively. Horizontal
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
item in the treatment condition (thus violating the “no liars” assumption) for fear their answer
on it could be inferred. Analysis of observed control group item counts suggests little potential
for floor effects in New Zealand and ceiling effects in London. Although there is mild potential for
ceiling effects in New Zealand—where 6% of the control group affirm all items—and floor effects
in London—where 9% of the control group negate all items—this is less severe than in existing
published list experiments (e.g., Blair, Imai, and Lyall 2014; Corstange 2018; Kuhn andVivyan 2018).
Fourth, exploiting respondents’ answers to list and direct turnout questions, we run the Aronow
et al. (2015) placebo test. This simultaneously tests the no design effect, no liars assumptions,
plus two additional assumptions: a “monotonicity” assumption that no false positives occur for
the direct question; and a “treatment independence” assumption that list experiment treatment
assignment is uncorrelatedwith direct question response. In both studies, at the 0.05 significance
level, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that all four assumptions hold. Finally, the model mis-
specification test developed in Blair et al. (2019, 460) to detect list experiment measurement
error—due either to nonstrategic misreporting or to other error processes—yields no significant
evidence of such error.
6.2 Standard Information Validation
We now assess list and direct question performance using standard information validation
approaches: comparative and population prevalence validation. Figure 1 compares direct and
list prevalence estimates of nonvoting—the sensitive behavior of interest—against each other
and against true population prevalence (i.e., true nonvoting prevalence among the eligible
electorate in the New Zealand and Greater London populations, according to official records).
For comparisons against a population benchmark, we show both raw and population-weighted
direct and list prevalence estimates.7
In New Zealand and London, both the direct question and list experiment underestimate
nonvotingcompared to truepopulationprevalence. Yet, consistentwithbetterperformanceunder
themore- and closer-is-better assumptions, the list estimate is substantially higher than thedirect
question estimate and closer to population prevalence. In New Zealand, the raw direct question
underestimates nonvotingby 15.8points,while the raw list experiment only does soby 10.2 points,
roughly a one-third reduction in error. A similar reduction in error occurs in London,where the raw
direct question underestimates nonvoting by 16.3 points and the raw list experiment only does so
7 New Zealand, estimates are weighted to the distribution of age, gender, region (Auckland versus non-Auckland), and elec-
tor type (general electoral roll versus Māori electoral roll). London, estimates are weighted to the population distribution
of age, gender, and educational qualifications using regression adjustment (Rosenfeld et al. 2016).




















































































































Table 2. Confusion matrices.
(a) New Zealand: direct question
Measured
Actual Voter Nonvoter N
Voter 0.998 0.002 1,617
[0.996, 1] [0, 0.004]
Nonvoter 0.29 0.71 100
[0.199, 0.378] [0.622, 0.801]
(b)New Zealand: list experiment
Measured
Actual Voter Nonvoter N
Voter 0.925 0.075 3,219
[0.872, 0.977] [0.023, 0.128]
Nonvoter 0.393 0.607 186
[0.06, 0.726] [0.274, 0.94]
(c) London: direct question
Measured
Actual Voter Nonvoter N
Voter 0.985 0.015 1,111
[0.978, 0.992] [0.008, 0.022]
Nonvoter 0.268 0.732 164
[0.199, 0.335] [0.665, 0.801]
(d) London: list experiment
Measured
Actual Voter Nonvoter N
Voter 0.921 0.079 2,218
[0.843, 0.998] [0.002, 0.157]
Nonvoter 0.429 0.571 336
[0.204, 0.652] [0.348, 0.796]
Notes: Rows in each table define actual turnout status: voter (“negative”) or nonvoter (“positive”). Columns
define measured turnout status. Cells contain row proportions with bootstrap 95% confidence intervals in
brackets. Rightmost column gives raw N of actual voters and nonvoters in estimation sample. Respondents
with nondefinitive true turnout measurements are omitted.
by 10.7 points. InNewZealand, the differencebetween the rawdirect and list prevalence estimates
is statistically distinguishable from zero with 95% confidence, but the difference between the
weighted estimates is not. In London, the difference between the raw prevalence estimates is not
distinguishable from zero, but the difference between the weighted estimates is. Thus, in both
surveys, standard information validation indicates that list experiment performs as well as—and
probably better than—direct question.
6.3 Partition Validation
Table 2 presents the confusion matrices that result from applying partition validation, exploiting
ourmeasureof truescores (i.e., of respondentnonvotingverifiedusingofficial records).8 Thedirect
question confusionmatrices show that, in bothNewZealand (Table 2a) and London (Table 2c), the
direct question does appear to suffer from strategic misreporting. Actual voters (norm-compliers)
are extremely unlikely to falsely report being a nonvoter—less than 1% and 2% do so in New
Zealand and London, respectively. In contrast, actual nonvoters (norm-defiers) falsely report
voting muchmore frequently—29% and 26.8% do so in New Zealand and London, respectively.9
Given that the direct turnout questions do indeed suffer from strategicmisreporting, do the list
experiments reduce overall reporting error? Table 2b and 2d suggests not. First, consider actual
nonvoters, who frequently misreport and generate false negatives for the direct question. Rather
than reducing false negatives among this group, there is no statistically distinguishable difference
between the rate of false negatives recovered by the list experiment and direct question in either
New Zealand or London. Point estimates for the difference are actually positive—10.3 points (95%
CI: [−24.8, 45.6]) in New Zealand and 16 points (95% CI: [−7.6, 39.6]) in London—indicating more
false negatives for the list experiment, if anything. There is thus little evidence that either list
experiment alleviates symptoms of direct question strategic misreporting.
8 Confidence intervals for partition validation are computed via nonparametric bootstrap. All quantities of interest are
computed for each given resample.
9 Consistent with this, online Appendix B shows that in follow-up questions in the London survey actual nonvoters report
being less comfortable about directly revealing their turnout than do actual voters.




















































































































Second, consider actual voters, of whom the direct question correctly classified all but a tiny
proportion in both New Zealand and London. Table 2b and 2d shows an increase in the rate of
false positives (the rate of measured nonvoting) among this groupwhen using the list experiment
rather than the direct turnout measure. For New Zealand, the estimated increase is 7.3 points
and distinguishable from zero (95% CI: [2.1, 12.5]). For London, it is 6.4 points, though not distin-
guishable from zero (95% CI: [−1.4, 14.2]). The increases in false positives among norm-compliers
induced by the list experiments are particularly consequential for overall reporting error, because
norm-compliers make up 94% and 86% of the vote-validated New Zealand and London samples,
respectively. The increases are also what we would expect to see if list experiments induce
nonstrategic misreporting not present for the direct questions.
What do our results imply about the proportion of nonstrategicmisreporters for each list exper-
iment? While partition validation alone does not identify this quantity, we compute two implied
proportions based on different sets of assumptions. First, we take a conservative approach,
assuming that only false positives can be confidently attributed to nonstrategic misreporting
(discounting false negatives among norm-defiers as potentially driven by strategic misreporting),
and that the response process of nonstrategic misreporters contributes positive measurements
only. Under these assumptions, the implied proportion of list experiment nonstrategic misre-
porters is simply the frequencyof falsepositivesamongnorm-compliers expressedasaproportion
of all responses: 0.07 for both New Zealand and London. Second, we take a less conservative
approach. This still makes the cautious assumption that only false positives can be confidently
attributed to nonstrategic misreporting, but now assumes that these misreporters contribute
positive measurements and negative measurements at equal rates (the expected outcome of
a uniform response process). Under these assumptions, the implied proportion of nonstrategic
misreporters is double the observed proportion of false positives in the sample (in expectation,
whatever proportion of cases are false positives, there will be an equivalent proportion where
nonstrategic misreporters contribute true negatives). This less conservative approach implies
that the proportion of nonstrategic misreporters is 0.14 for both New Zealand and London.
All of these implied proportions are substantially higher than the proportion of respondents
assumed to be nonstrategic misreporters (0.03) in existing simulation studies (Ahlquist 2018;
Blair et al. 2019).
Figure 2 summarizes overall direct question and list experiment classification performance
as measured by accuracy. Unsurprisingly, given that the point estimate of the rate of false posi-
tives among actual voters and of false negatives among actual nonvoters was higher for the list
experiment than the direct question in both surveys, the list experiment performs worse than the
direct question in terms of overall classification accuracy for both New Zealand and London. The
difference in theaccuracyof the twomeasures is 7points inNewZealand (95%CI: [2.06, 12.66]) and
8 points in London (95% CI: [0.23, 15.23]). In online Appendix E, we show that the list experiment
also tends tounderperformthedirectquestionaccording toalternative classificationperformance
measures, including recall of voting and recall of nonvoting. In online Appendix F, we show that
both list experiments continue to underperform direct questions in terms of reporting accuracy
when we use alternative direct question measures and alternative list estimators.
We emphasize the following key findings from this partition validation. First, the partition
validation results are consistent with the notion that list experiments induce nonstrategic mis-
reporting that is largely absent for a direct question. Second, even conservative estimates of
the proportion of list experiment nonstrategic misreporters in our data are twice as large as the
proportion assumed in existing simulation analyses of list experiment nonstrategic. Third, despite
the promising results of standard information validation and standard information diagnostics,
once we use true scores to improve validation, both list experiment measures are shown to
generate more misreporting error overall than corresponding direct question measures.
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(a) Accuracy: New Zealand
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(c) Accuracy: London
−0.20 −0.15 −0.10 −0.05 0.00
(b) Difference (list − direct): New Zealand
−0.20 −0.15 −0.10 −0.05 0.00
(d) Difference (list − direct): London
Figure 2. Measurement accuracy of direct and list experiment turnout measures. Notes: Plots (a) and (c)
display, for New Zealand and London, respectively, direct and list accuracy. Dashed vertical lines indicate a
perfect score.Plots (b) and (d)displaydifferences in list anddirectquestionaccuracy.Horizontal lines indicate
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
6.4 Evidence of Nonstrategic Misreporting Due to Satisficing
We now provide evidence that satisficing behavior may be an important driver of list experiment
nonstrategic misreporting. Recall that satisficing involves respondents answering more complex
list experiment questions differently to direct questions because of the shortcuts they adopt to
limit timeandeffort spent on the former. To examinewhether suchbehavior drives list experiment
underperformance, we focus on the London survey, where we have the measures necessary to
identify respondents who exhibit satisficing-consistent behavior when answering the list experi-
ment.
We identify probable satisficers based on two pieces of information: recall of the listed items
and time taken to answer the list experiment question. To measure recall, we rely on a follow-
up question which asked respondents to recall the first and last items on the list they had seen
two questions earlier. Respondents were presented with open text boxes to record their answers,
or could tick “don’t know.” Responses were coded as offering correct recall if they were judged
to describe the correct activity using any form of words. We classify a respondent as a probable
satisficer if theywere unable to correctly recall either the first or last itemon the list and if they are
also in thebottomquartile in termsof time taken toanswer the list experimentquestion.Measured
in this way, the proportion of probable list experiment satisficers in the London sample is 0.12,
slightly lower than the implied proportion that we computed under the less conservative set of
assumptions in the previous subsection.10
In Figure 3, we subset the London sample into probable satisficers and nonsatisficers and,
for each subgroup, use partition validation to calculate the accuracy of the list measure and
of the direct measure based on the “baseline” direct turnout question asked by YouGov of all
respondents following the 2017 General Election. Figure 3a shows that the list measure of turnout
is clearly less accurate among probable satisficers (right panel) than among probable nonsatisfi-
cers (le panel). This would be expected if nonstrategic misreporting due to satisficing drives list
experiment inaccuracy.
Figure 3b also shows that the list measure of turnout obtained from probable satisficers is
significantly less accurate than the direct measure obtained for the same respondents. Among
probable nonsatisficers, the list experiment still does not outperform the direct question in terms
of accuracy, but the difference between the two measures is substantially smaller and indistin-
guishable from zero with 95% confidence. These patterns are consistent with the list question
10 The proportion of respondents who failed to correctly recall either the first or last list itemwas 0.39 (0.45 for the first item
only; 0.56 for the last item only). In online Appendix G, we show that our findings regarding satisficing and accuracy are
robust to different measurement strategies for identifying satisficers.
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(b) Differences in accuracy
Figure 3. Measurement accuracy by probable list experiment satisficing, London sample. Notes: Plot (a)
shows direct and list accuracy among probable nonsatisficers (le panel) and satisficers (right panel) in
the London sample. Plot (b) shows differences in list and direct question accuracy. Horizontal lines indicate
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
inducing satisficing and nonstrategicmisreporting that respondents do not engage inwhen asked
a direct question.
6.5 Sample Prevalence Validation
Would the relative underperformance of the list experiments have been detected if we had simply
used the true scores to conduct sample prevalence validation (comparing prevalence estimates to
overall true sample prevalence), rather than partition validation? To check this, we perform sam-
ple prevalence validation in online Appendix D. For New Zealand, sample prevalence validation
results partially concur with our partition validation finding of list experiment underperformance:
the list prevalence estimate is further than the direct prevalence estimate from the true sample
prevalence, although the 95% confidence interval for the difference between the two marginally
overlaps with zero.11 For London, whereas partition validation revealed the list experiment to per-
form substantially worse than the direct question in terms of reporting error, sample prevalence
validation shows the list experiment performing no worse—and probably better—than the direct
question. Thekey reason for this discrepancy is that the falsenegatives and falsepositivespartially
cancel out, and therefore go unnoticed, when assessing overall prevalence estimates.
7 Discussion
The relative magnitude of list experiment nonstrategic misreporting error and direct question
strategic misreporting will depend on a number of factors that are likely to vary by context. What,
then, are the implications of our validation results for researchers considering list experiments for
other topics or in other settings?
To address this question, we begin with a simple parameterization of the general trade-off
between direct question strategic misreporting and list experiment nonstrategic misreporting.
We do so based on the models developed in Section 2, making the simplifying assumption
that nonstrategic misreporter status is independent of norm-complier/defier status and that the
expected list DiM among nonstrategic misreporters is 0.5. Based on this, online Appendix H
derives an indifference function which, for a given level of true norm-defier prevalence (π) and
proportion of list experiment nonstrategic misreporters (λ), gives the proportion of norm-defiers
that must strategically misreport for the direct question (θ) such that expected list and direct
question accuracy are equalized. Figure 4plots resulting indifference curves for three levels of true
11 This result demonstrates how list experiment nonstrategic misreporting can generate overall list prevalence estimates
worse than those from a direct question subject to strategic misreporting.





































































































































































Figure 4. The direct question versus list experiment accuracy trade-off. Notes: Indifference curves showing,
for varying proportions of list experiment nonstrategicmisreporter (x-axis), what proportion of norm-defiers
must strategically misreport for the direct question (y-axis), such that expected direct question and list
experiment accuracy are equalized. The area above (below) a curve indicates superior list experiment (direct
question) accuracy. Each curve assumes a different level of true norm-defier prevalence (π). All curves
assume nonstrategic misreporter status is independent of norm-defier status and expected list DiM of 0.5
among nonstrategic misreporters.
norm-defier prevalence. The area above (below) a curve indicates superior expected list experi-
ment (direct question) accuracy.
To decide whether a list experiment can be expected to improve on a direct question in terms
of reporting error, a researcher planning a study will need to make assumptions about where
their case is located in the parameter space depicted in Figure 4. Our validation studies provide
an initial benchmark location that can help inform this judgement. Regarding the x-axis, the
implied proportion of nonstrategic misreporters in our list experiments was 0.07 under conser-
vative assumptions and 0.14 under less conservative assumptions, higher than the proportions
previously assumed in simulation studies. Regarding the y-axis, the observed proportion of norm-
defiers who misreported for a direct turnout question was 0.29 in the New Zealand survey and
0.27 in the London survey. Consider the indifference curve for π = 0.09, which corresponds to
the true proportion of norm-defiers pooling our surveys. In Figure 4, any combination of the
aforementioned x and y values falls below the indifference curve. Thus, if we set parameter values
basedonourvalidation results concerning the topicofnonvotingamongNewZealandandLondon
survey respondents, we arrive at a region of the parameter space where expected list experiment
accuracy is inferior to expected direct question accuracy (consistent with the actual differences in
overall accuracy observed in Section 6).
In what ways would we expect studies of other topics in other survey settings to depart from
this region of the parameter space, and with what consequences for relative list experiment
performance? First, we might plausibly expect a shi upward along the y-axis in Figure 4 for
some cases of interest. While our evidence clearly indicated direct question strategicmisreporting
among nonvoters, failing to vote merely violates a social norm in the countries studied. Other
researchers may be interested in sensitive attitudes or behaviors that invite serious legal or
physical consequences if admitted to. For these topics, such as support for U.S.-led security forces
among Afghans (Blair et al. 2014) or acceptance of clientelistic payoffs among voters (Corstange
2018), strategic misreporting under the direct question is plausibly higher than we found for
nonvoting. In addition, whereas we studied self-complete surveys, direct question strategic mis-
reporting may increase in interviewer-administered surveys, where social desirability concerns




















































































































may be more acute (Tourangeau and Yan 2007). Whether due to changes in topic or mode of
administration, how much higher would direct question strategic misreporting need to be for
the list experiment to outperform the direct question in expectation? Given the assumptions of
Figure 4, if π were 0.09 and if the proportion of nonstrategic misreporters was similar to that
implied by our data under conservative assumptions (i.e., 0.07), then a researcher would need
to believe that the proportion of norm-defiers who strategically misreport for the direct question
is above 0.39 to reasonably expect the list experiment to outperform the direct question in terms
of accuracy. If the proportion of nonstrategic misreporters was similar to that implied by our data
under less conservative assumptions (i.e., 0.14), the researcher would want to be confident that
the proportion of norm-defiers strategically misreporting for a direct question is more than 0.78.
Second, comparison across indifference curves in Figure 4 makes clear that the misreporting
trade-off between list experiment and direct question depends on the true prevalence of norm-
defiers for the sensitive topic of interest. For a fixed amount of direct question strategic misre-
porting and list experiment nonstrategicmisreporting, the relative accuracy of the list experiment
increases as true norm-defier prevalence increases. Themarginal cost of additional list nonstrate-
gic misreporting (in terms of relative accuracy) is also lower when true norm-defier prevalence
is higher (indicated by the slopes of the indifference curves). This is because increases in norm-
defier prevalence mean more norm-defier survey respondents and a greater proportion of the
overall sample susceptible to strategic misreporting incentives if asked a direct question. In the
cases we study, norm-defier prevalence among survey respondents is low (0.09 pooling across
both surveys), which advantages the direct question over the list experiment. In a case where
the level of direct question strategic misreporting and list experiment nonstrategic misreporting
were equivalent to those apparent in our studies, but where norm-defier prevalence rose to 0.3,
the list experiment would be expected to outperform the direct question in terms of accuracy.
Researchers in other settings will therefore need to carefully develop priors about the likely
prevalence of norm-defiers among the respondents they expect to survey. For example, studying
the sensitive topic of vote-buying, Corstange (2018, 81) cites local observers as estimating that at
least half of Lebanese electors have their votes “bought,” suggesting amuchhigher norm-defiance
prevalence than in our case, and therefore more favorable conditions for a list experiment on this
dimension.
Turning to the third parameter that varies in Figure 4, the proportion of list experiment non-
strategicmisreporters,we contend that the caseswe studyare relatively favorable to the list exper-
iment on this dimension. On the one hand, high-cost face-to-face surveys may encourage better
engagement and therefore less nonstrategic misreporting than our self-complete surveys. On the
other hand, our New Zealand list experiment was embedded in a reputable national election
study, where respondentswill plausibly have felt a greater sense of duty to engagewith the survey
than usual, and the experiment was also only the second question on the survey, minimizing
disengagement due to tiring. Moreover, existing placebo studies suggest that reporting error in list
experiments is greater among less educated respondents, who are less well equipped to process
and answer a more complex list-style survey question (Kramon and Weghorst 2019; Riambau and
Ostwald 2020). From this perspective, the rate of nonstrategicmisreporting in the list experiments
we have studied should be comparatively low, since the New Zealand and London populations
from which we sample exhibit high levels of literacy, numeracy, and general education, from a
comparative perspective. Even in these cases, our evidence is consistent with 7%—or even 14%,
depending on assumptions—of respondents being list experiment nonstrategic misreporters.
Researchers planning surveys on sensitive topics in developing countries where education levels
are lower—and where list experiments are increasingly used (Kramon and Weghorst 2019)—
thus have reason to expect higher levels of list nonstrategic misreporting than we have found,
an effective shi rightward in Figure 4. In such cases, the amount of direct question strategic




















































































































misreporting and/or norm-defier prevalence would need to be considerably higher than in our
case for expected list experiment accuracy to reach expected direct question accuracy.
In sum, compared to the caseswehave validated, othersmaypresentmore favorable scenarios
for the list experiment in terms of the misreporting trade-off, since they may feature higher
rates of direct question strategic misreporting among norm-defiers and higher prevalence of
norm-defiers. However, we also suggest that for other cases, the proportion of list experiment
nonstrategic misreporters is likely to be similar to or greater than the nontrivial proportions
implied in our data. Where this is higher, all else equal, relative list experiment accuracy will be
lower than in the cases we study.
The misreporting trade-off is not the only one between direct questions and list experiments.
Blair et al. (2020) examine a different and better known trade-off between direct question preva-
lence estimate bias (due to strategic misreporting) and list prevalence estimate inefficiency (due
to masking via aggregation of sensitive and control items). They characterize this bias-variance
trade-off in terms of prevalence estimate root-mean-square error (RMSE) and, for varying sample
sizes, show at what level of direct question strategic misreporting the list experiment RMSE is as
good as the direct question RMSE. Does our analysis of the misreporting trade-off—as informed
by our empirical validation results—have any implications for the choice between direct question
and list experiment beyond those that emerge from consideration of the bias-variance trade-off?
A simple example suggests it does. Take the same three norm-defier prevalence levels consid-
ered in Figure 4 and assume the proportion of list experiment nonstrategic misreporters is 0.07.
Adopting the Blair et al. (2020) parameterization of the bias-variance trade-off and assuming a
healthy sample size of 5,000 in each case, for the list prevalence estimate to achieve an RMSE as
goodas thedirectquestion, theproportionofnorm-defiers strategicallymisreporting for thedirect
questionmust reach0.27 (whenπ = 0.09), 0.12 (whenπ = 0.2), and0.08 (whenπ = 0.3). All three of
these threshold rates of direct question strategicmisreporting amongnorm-defiers are lower than
those found when the same scenarios are considered in terms of the misreporting trade-off as in
Figure 4 (0.39, 0.18, and 0.12, respectively). In other words, in all three scenarios, the level of direct
question strategic misreporting required for the list experiment to match the direct question on
the bias-variance trade-off is lower than that required for the list experiment to match the direct
question on themisreporting trade-off.12 This example shows that, when one takes reporting error
as an evaluation criterion and considers levels of nonstrategic misreporting that are conservative
given our evidence, the range of settings in which list experiments outperform direct questions is
narrower thanpreviously thought. Therefore, researchers choosingbetweena list experiment and
adirect question on any sensitive topic should consider not just thewell-known trade-offbetween
bias under the direct question and inefficiency under the list experiment, but also the trade-off
between strategic misreporting error for the direct question and nonstrategic misreporting error
for the list experiment.
8 Conclusion
This paper has provided the first empirical validation of list experiments that distinguishes
between true and false negative and positive measurements on the sensitive variable. In doing
so, it provided new evidence of the problem of list experiment nonstrategic misreporting in
practice. We examined nonvoting in elections across two different countries with relatively
educated populations, exploiting measures of true respondent turnout behavior to perform
partition validation in both settings. We found that list experiments induced respondents to
nonstrategicallymisreportmore thandirectquestionsandathigher rates thanassumed inexisting
12 Thiswill not always be true: for example, when sample size is small, the direct questionwill outperform the list experiment
on prevalence estimate RMSE even for very high levels of strategic misreporting.




















































































































simulation studies. This nonstrategic misreporting was not detected by standard diagnostics or
validation approaches, but was still severe enough that both list experiments underperformed
simpledirectquestions (which themselves suffered fromstrategicmisreporting) in termsofoverall
reporting accuracy.
Our findings highlight the importance of the trade-off between direct question strategic misre-
porting and list experiment nonstrategic misreporting. We showed how, given a simple parame-
terization for this general trade-off, our empirical findings can help researchers gauge what level
of direct question strategic misreporting and norm-defier prevalence would need to pertain for a
list experiment to be accuracy-improving.
Our findings also underline the importance of future research into the reduction of list experi-
ment nonstrategic misreporting. One approach to this involves embedding attention check ques-
tions to identify respondentsmore likely to nonstrategicallymisreport (Oppenheimer,Meyvis, and
Davidenko2009;Eady2017;Alvarezetal.2019).However, Alvarezetal. (2019)pointout thatdealing
with identified inattentives is not straightforward, since dropping such respondents could lead to
selection bias in inferences.
Another recent suggestion is to include a placebo statement (i.e., a statement no respondent
can truthfully affirm) in the control list, such that the total available items is equalized in the con-
trol and treatment list (Riambau and Ostwald 2020). If list experiment nonstrategic misreporters
reported item counts are a function of list length, this would yield an expected DiM of zero among
nonstrategic misreporters. However, as shown formally in online Appendix I, this approach does
not eliminate errors due to list experiment nonstrategic misreporting, since nonstrategic misre-
porters who are actual norm-defiers still contribute false negatives. It does though, under certain
assumptions, at least allow researchers to sign the resulting prevalence estimate bias as negative.
If it is not possible to meaningfully reduce list experiment nonstrategic misreporting, might
one generally use list experiments alongside direct questions to estimate bounds for norm-defier
prevalence? This may work if: (a) strategic misreporting downward biases the direct prevalence
estimator; (b) nonstrategic misreporting upward biases the list experiment estimator. While (a)
should hold generally, (b) is problematic, since Section 2 showed that nonstrategic misreporting
can up- or downward bias list prevalence estimates. If nonstrategic misreporter and actual norm-
defier status are orthogonal, we at least know that list prevalence estimates are upward biased
when the expected DiM among nonstrategic misreporters exceeds true norm-defier prevalence.
Applied researchers will not be able to fully verify this condition but could check its plausibility
by estimating the DiM among probable nonstrategic misreporters (identified using either an
attention check or a mixture of list experiment recall questions and response time information).
We encourage further research into this potential approach.
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Replication code for this article has been published in Code Ocean, a computational repro-
ducibility platform that enables users to run the code and can be viewed interactively at Kuhn
and Vivyan (2020a) at https://doi.org/10.24433/CO.3695413.v1. A preservation copy of the same
code and data can also be accessed via Dataverse at Kuhn and Vivyan (2020b) at https://doi.
org/10.7910/DVN/W90Q7B.
Supplementary Material
For supplementary material accompanying this paper, please visit https://doi.org/10.1017.pan.
2021.10.
References
Ahlquist, J. S. 2018. “List Experiment Design, Non-Strategic Respondent Error, and Item Count Technique
Estimates.” Political Analysis 26(1):34–53.
Alvarez, R. M., L. R. Atkeson, I. Levin, and Y. Li. 2019. “Paying Attention to Inattentive Survey Respondents.”
Political Analysis 27(2):145–162.
Aronow, P., A. Coppock, F. W. Crawford, and D. P. Green. 2015. “Combining List Experiments and Direct
Question Estimates of Sensitive Behavior Prevalence.” Journal of Survey Statistics and Methodology
3(1):43–66.
Belli, R. F., M. W. Traugott, and M. N. Beckmann. 2001. “What Leads to Vote Overreports? Contrasts of
Overreports to Validated Voters and Admitted Nonvoters in the American National Election Studies.”
Journal of Official Statistics 17(4):479–498.
Blair, G., W. Chou, and K. Imai. 2019. “List Experiments with Measurement Error.” Political Analysis
27(4):455–480.
Blair, G., A. Coppock, and M. Moor. 2020. “When to Worry About Sensitivity Bias: A Social Reference Theory
and Evidence from 30 Years of List Experiments.” American Political Science Review 114(4):1297–1315.
Blair, G., and K. Imai. 2012. “Statistical Analysis of List Experiments.” Political Analysis 20(1):47–77.
Blair, G., K. Imai, and J. Lyall. 2014. “Comparing and Combining List and Endorsement Experiments:
Evidence from Afghanistan.” American Journal of Political Science 58(4):1043–1063.
Blais, A., and C. H. Achen. 2019. “Civic Duty and Voter Turnout.” Political Behavior 41(2):473–497.
Corstange, D. 2018. “Clientelism in Competitive and Uncompetitive Elections.” Comparative Political Studies
51(1):76–104.
Eady, G. 2017. “The Statistical Analysis of Misreporting on Sensitive Survey Questions.” Political Analysis
25(2):241–259.
Höglinger, M., and A. Diekmann. 2017. “Uncovering a Blind Spot in Sensitive Question Research: False
Positives Undermine the Crosswise-Model RRT.” Political Analysis 25(1):131–137.
Höglinger, M., and B. Jann. 2018. “More Is Not Always Better: An Experimental Individual-Level Validation of
the Randomized Response Technique and the Crosswise Model.” PLoS One 13(8):e0201770.
Holbrook, A. L., and J. A. Krosnick. 2010. “Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the
Item Count Techniques.” Public Opinion Quarterly 74(1):37–67.
Kramon, E., and K. Weghorst. 2019. “(Mis)Measuring Sensitive Attitudes with the List Experiment: Solutions
to List Experiment Breakdown in Kenya.” Public Opinion Quarterly 83(1):236–263.
Krosnick, J. A. 1991. “Response Strategies for Coping with the Cognitive Demands of Attitude Measures in
Surveys.” Journal of Cognitive Psychology 5(3):213–236.
Krosnick, J. A., and S. Presser. 2010. “Question and Questionnaire Design.” In Handbook of Survey Research,
edited by J. D. Wright and P. V. Marsdent, 263–314. 2nd edn. San Diego, CA: Elsevier.
Kuhn, P. M., and N. Vivyan. 2018. “Reducing Turnout Misreporting in Online Surveys.” Public Opinion
Quarterly 82(2):300–321.
Kuhn, P. M., and N. Vivyan. 2020a. “Replication Data for: The Misreporting Trade-Off Between List
Experiments and Direct Questions in Practice: Partition Validation Evidence from Two Countries.” Code
Ocean. https://doi.org/10.24433/CO.3695413.v1.
Kuhn, P. M., and N. Vivyan. 2020b. “Replication Data for: The Misreporting Trade-Off Between List
Experiments and Direct Questions in Practice: Partition Validation Evidence from Two Countries.” Harvard
Dataverse, V1. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/W90Q7B.
Lax, J., J. Phillips, and A. Stollwerk. 2016. “Are Survey Respondents Lying About Their Support for Same-Sex
Marriage?” Public Opinion Quarterly 80(2):510–533.
Manning, C. D., P. Raghavan, and H. Schütze. 2009. An Introduction to Information Retrieval. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Oppenheimer, D. M., T. Meyvis, and N. Davidenko. 2009. “Instructional Manipulation Checks: Detecting
Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45(4):867–872.




















































































































Presser, S. 1990. “Can Context Changes Reduce Vote Over-Reporting?” Public Opinion Quarterly
54(4):586–593.
Riambau, G., and K. Ostwald. 2020. “Placebo Statements in List Experiments: Evidence from a Face-to-Face
Survey in Singapore.” Political Science Research and Methods 9:172–179. doi:10.1017/psrm.2020.18.
Rosenfeld, B., K. Imai, and J. N. Shapiro. 2016. “An Empirical Validation Study of Popular Survey
Methodologies for Sensitive Questions.” American Journal of Political Science 60(3):783–802.
Tourangeau, R., and T. Yan. 2007. “Sensitive Questions in Surveys.” Psychological Bulletin 133(5):859–883.
Patrick M. Kuhn and Nick Vivyan ` Political Analysis 22
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
://
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 IP
 a
dd
re
ss
: 9
0.
19
4.
23
8.
39
, o
n 
20
 M
ay
 2
02
1 
at
 1
4:
11
:2
4,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
Ca
m
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
://
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
 h
tt
ps
://
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/p
an
.2
02
1.
10
